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Positional Risk, Forces of Nature, and
Workmen's Compensation
Thomas Parker Hayes*
T HE OHIO COURTS, in their interpretation of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law,' have attempted to establish clear-cut principles of
compensability for the working man when his on-the-job injuries are
caused by the forces of nature and acts of God. However, the attempts
of the courts to establish rules of compensability fail to provide
predictability and consistency. The principles proposed are inadequate
to cover all the situations that may arise.
The rule has generally been that injuries which result solely from
the forces of nature or acts of God are not compensable from the state
insurance fundla If it can be proven however, that the nature of the
employment created an increased hazard, or had, in some way, combined
with the elements to produce the injury, then recovery will be allowed.2
In too many cases the courts have denied benefits to workers whose
jobs have placed them in a position of vulnerability to the forces of
nature where the specific requirements of increased hazard or of causal
connection have not been met. Recovery for the individual who is
forced to be subjected to the elements can still be barred by the "as-
sumption-of-the-risk" defense that shielded the employer from liability
prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The rem-
edies available to the man whose duties have carried him out-of-doors and
placed him in a position of potential risk should be such that the incon-
sistencies and inadequacies that presently exist are removed.
All too often the employee has been placed in a position of peril
where the likelihood of his being injured by the elements is greatly
increased above that of the general public. However, the courts have not
always considered the mere placing of an employee in a position of peril
sufficient to authorize payment of benefits under the "increased hazards"
requirement of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Compensation should be allowed whenever an employee is forced
by his job to subject himself to an unusual extent to the elements.
The criterion of positional risk, or position of peril, would place
* B.A., Denison University; D.C., Palmer College of Chiropractic; Second-year stu-
dent, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 Ohio Rev. Code, Ch. 41.
la Industrial Comm. v. Carden, 129 Ohio St. 344, 195 N.E. 387 (1935); Slanina v.
Industrial Comm., 117 Ohio St. 329, 158 N.E. 829 (1927); Johnson v. Industrial Comm.,
49 Ohio App. 419, 197 N.E. 387 (1935).
2 Industrial Comm. v. Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500, 176 N.E. 74 (1931); Jones v. Indus-
trial Comm., 60 Ohio App. 465, 21 N.E. 2d 1014 (1938); Industrial Comm. v. Laraway,
46 Ohio App. 168, 188 N.E. 297 (1933).
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compensability for losses due to the elements on a more predictable and
consistent basis. The rules for recovery would not vary substantially
from case to case or from condition to condition.
Historical Background
Prior to 1910, the employee in the State of Ohio had no source for
recovery of compensation for injuries suffered in the course of his em-
ployment. He would usually receive compensation only if he had made
some personal preparation to protect himself from the financial burden
that injury and loss of time from work imposed. The defense, utilized
by employers to escape the burden of responsibility, was that the em-
ployees "assumed the risk" of injury when they accepted the employ-
ment.
The first dent was made in the employer's iron-clad position when
the Norris Bill 3 was passed on April 30, 1910. The Norris Bill deprived
the employer of the use of the "assumption of the risk" defense when he
failed to remedy ordinary defects. It also provided the employee with
some possibility of recovery in the event he was slightly negligent in
the performance of his job.4 On May 10, 1910, Senate Bill 2505 was
passed, which provided for a study commission of five men (two from
labor, two from industry, and one attorney) to investigate the possibility
of a direct compensation law, or other similar law, which would place
some liability upon employers for accidental injuries suffered by em-
ployees while on the job.G
After the passage of Senate Bill 250 in 1910, participation in the
Workmen's Compensation program was opened to the employers on a
voluntary basis. However, by special election in 1913, an amendment
was passed which required compulsory participation in the Workmen's
Compensation program by employers of five or more persons. The
practice of employee contributions to the fund was also eliminated. This
was further revised and amended in 1924 to include employers of three
or more persons under the compulsory participation requirements.7
Since its inception, the number of claims processed through the
Bureau of Workmen's Compensation has reached the level where over
1,200 new claims are received every day and further action is required
on at least an equal number of old claims.8
3 101 Ohio Laws 195.
4 J. Young, Workmen's Compensation Law of Ohio, 6 (1963).
5 101 Ohio Laws 231.
6 Young, op. cit. supra n. 4.
7 Id. at 8.
8 Bureau of Workmen's Compensation and Industrial Commission, Handbook of
Service and Billing (1962).
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Accidental Injury
To obtain benefits from the state insurance fund for losses resulting
from the forces of nature or acts of God, the claimant must prove that he
has received an accidental injury. The Ohio Workmen's Compensation
Act specifically defines what constitutes an accidental injury:
... "Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received
in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employ-
ment.9
The statute further defines what constitutes an injury and provides
that an employee who is injured (or his dependents, in the event he is
killed), provided the injuries are not self-inflicted, is entitled to receive
compensation for losses sustained, as well as medical expenses, and in
the event of death, funeral expenses. 10
Occupational Diseases
Under the Workmen's Compensation Law the regulations and re-
quirements for recovery for losses due to diseases and illnesses differ
from the language of the usual "in the course of, and arising out of the
employment" formula which is applied when an accidental injury is ex-
perienced.
In the area of occupational diseases the statutes are very specific
as to what diseases are compensable. If an occupational disease is not
specifically named, and if the disease was not contracted in the course
of an employment in which the employee was engaged at some time
within twelve months previous to the date of the disablement, the
disease is not compensable. 1 1
Because of the exacting requirements for recovery under these sec-
tions, many conditions and illnesses that could befall an employee are
not compensable even though they arise out of and in the course of
employment. The only provision for such contingencies allowed under
the law is that compensation may be obtained for a disease that is pe-
culiar to a certain industry or business, provided that the employee is
not subjected to the hazard or condition which produced the disease
when he is not engaged in his employment.
1 2
Once it is established that an employee has contracted, in the course
of his employment, a compensable disease or condition, he is then en-
titled to the same benefits and compensation available to an employee
9 Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 4123.01(c).
10 Ibid., sec. 4123.54.
11 Id., sec. 4123.68.
12 Id.
May, 1970
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who is injured or killed as a result of an accidental injury received in the
course of, and arising out of, his employment. 13
Strict construction of the statute has barred persons from recover-
ing benefits for diseases they contracted in the course of their employ-
ment because their particular condition was not specifically named or
they failed to satisfy the requirements that the person is not subjected
to the same hazard or condition when he is not engaged in his employ-
ment or occupation.
Forces of Nature and Acts of God
In addition to the multitude of claims made each year for acci-
dental injuries and occupational diseases, yet another category of claims
has been made for the injuries and deaths that have been attributed to
the effects of the forces of nature and acts of God.
An act of God does not arise out of earthly employment, but if the
employment, through its activities, conditions or environments, sub-
jects an employee to a greater hazard from the act of God than
that to which the general public in the community is subject, and
the employee is injured by the act of God to which he is so sub-
jected, a causal connection between the employment and the in-
jury is thereby established and the case is compensable under the
Workmen's Compensation Law.14
There has been difficulty in properly categorizing the claims result-
ing from the forces of nature because there was no provision made for
such injuries in the Workmen's Compensation Law. The difficulty arises
because the claims may be for injuries of a traumatic nature, such as
injury or death resulting from lightning,15 storms,'6 or ice and snow,17
or the claim may be for a disease or pathological condition such as
heat stroke or heat exhaustion,' frostbite, 19 or pneumonia. 20
13 Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 4123.54.
14 This quote, frequently cited by the courts in cases dealing with claims for injuries
received from the forces of nature and acts of God was taken from the Syllabus of
the Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra n. la.
15 Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra n. la; Industrial Comm. v. Laraway, supra
n. 2.
16 Industrial Comm. v. Hampton, supra n. 2; Slanina v. Industrial Comm., supra
n. la; Industrial Comm. v. Kovacs, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 248 (1931).
17 Walborn v. General Fireproofing, 147 Ohio St. 507, 72 N.E. 2d 95 (1947); Brennan
v. Keller, 15 Ohio App. 2d 79, 239 N.E. 2d 97 (1968); Barrett Division, Allied Chem.
v. Owens, 110 Ohio App. 316, 169 N.E. 2d 435 (1960).
18 Malone v. Industrial Comm., 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942); Cavanaugh
v. Industrial Comm., 63 Ohio App. 256, 26 N.E. 2d 215 (1939); Ford Motor Co, v.
Hunter, 50 Ohio App. 547, 199 N.E. 85 (1935); Johnson v. Industrial Comm., supra
n. la; Kemna v. Industrial Comm., 12 Ohio Ops. 144 (Hamilton County C.P., 1938);
Rettig v. Industrial Comm., 9 Ohio Ops. 422 (1937).
19 Kaiser v. Industrial Comm., 136 Ohio St. 440, 26 N.E. 2d 449 (1940); Moskell v.
Industrial Comm., 91 Ohio App. 112, 107 N.E. 2d 543 (1951); Jones v. Industrial
Comm., supra n. 2.
20 Johnson v. Industrial Comm., 164 Ohio St. 297, 130 N.E. 2d 807 (1955).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss2/36
19 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)
In the absence of statutory provisions to provide a basis for the
determination of compensability for injuries or diseases arising out of
the forces of nature, the case law has been controlling in these situations.
It is noted that much of the law has gone unaltered since the 1930's when
a substantial portion of the precedent was established.
The prevailing view has drawn a very fine line between what con-
stitutes a compensable claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
and what does not. A heavy burden has been placed on the injured em-
ployee, (or in the case of death of the employee, on his estate) to show
that his claim meets the requirements of compensability.
It has been established that recovery will be barred for a claimant
who suffers loss or injury solely as a result of the elements. 2 1 The
courts have also held that the employee is denied recovery if his ex-
posure to the elements presents no greater hazard to himself than that to
which the general public is exposed at the same time.22 One way to
qualify for recovery from the state insurance fund for losses resulting
from the forces of nature or acts of God is to show that the employee
has been subjected to a greater hazard than that to which the general
public has been subjected. 23 A second way a claimant qualifies for re-
covery under the Workmen's Compensation Law for injuries caused by
the forces of nature is to prove that the elements did not act alone in
producing the injury. In either case there must be a causal connection
shown between the employment and the elements that combined to pro-
duce the injury.24
The ramifications of the aforementioned guidelines can be better
understood when viewed in the light of specific cases that have produced
these standards.
In June of 1924 a severe tornado struck the northwestern part of
the State of Ohio. Two cases arising from this incident have contributed
much to the law in this area.
In Slanina v. Industrial Commission of Ohio25 the plaintiff-employee
was, in the course of his employment, making deliveries when he sus-
tained injuries as a result of a telephone pole, blown down by the
21 Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra n. la; Johnson v. Industrial Comm., supra
n. la.
22 Walborn v. General Fireproofing, supra n. 17; Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra
n. la; Slanina v. Industrial Comm., supra n. la; Johnson v. Industrial Comm., supra
n. la.
23 Malone v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 18; Industrial v. Carden, supra n. la; Cava-
naugh v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 18; Industrial Comm. v. Laraway, supra n. 2;
Industrial Comm. v. Kovacs, 10 Ohio Law Abs. 248 (1931).
24 Malone v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 18; Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra n. la;
Industrial Comm. v. Hampton, supra n. 2; Ford Motor Co. v. Hunter, supra n. 18;
Industrial Comm. v. Laraway, supra n. 2.
25 Supra n. la.
May, 1970
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storm, striking the car in which he was riding. In its decision the Su-
preme Court of Ohio did concede that:
• . . the fact that the injury was caused by the act of God does
not, however, necessarily deprive the injured party of the right to
recovery . . . if the employe's [sic] duties exposed him to some
special danger not common to the public.2
The court denied this particular plaintiff recovery under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. It held that although the plaintiff was injured
in the course of his employment, as a result of the elements, he had been
exposed to no greater risk than had the general public at that particular
time and place. The Court, in its opinion, mentioned that Slanina's duties
required him to make the required deliveries without regard for the
weather conditions, but did not seem to consider that he might have
sought refuge from the storm had it not been for his employment re-
quiring his performance of his duties.
The second case arising out of the same tornado was Industrial
Commission of Ohio v. Hampton27 in which the decedent was a yard
foreman whose duties called him to a storage warehouse, where he was
loading a truck when the tornado struck. The decedent, and others,
sought refuge in the warehouse, and when the storm leveled the building,
he was crushed to death. In finding for Hampton, the court stated that
if he had been caught out-of-doors and thrown against a tree or a build-
ing, he would have been subject to the same hazards as was the rest of
the community and the claim would have been barred as not being due
to any hazard peculiar to the employment. Since the collapse of the
building was the proximate cause of his death, the rule that injuries
which are a result of a combination of the elements and the employment
are compensable would apply. This latter view of compensability where
the elements and the employment combine to produce the injury is
found in Industrial Commission v. Kovacs 28 where the plaintiff was in-
jured when a tent, in which he sought refuge from a storm, collapsed,
and caused a fracture of his skull and also affected his hearing. The
court distinguished this case from Slanina by saying that Kovacs had
no other immediate protection from the storm, whereas, the general
public most likely would have had adequate protection. Hence, the rule
that the plaintiff was subjected to a greater hazard than the general
public was applied and compensation was allowed.
In cases involving the effect of lightning, the general principle that
an act of God operating by itself to produce the injury is not compen-
sable, is followed closely as in the tornado cases. An employee's death,
from being struck by lightning, was deemed not to be the result of his
26 Id. at 333.
27 Supra n. 2.
28 Supra n. 16.
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employment because there was no evidence showing a causal connec-
tion between the employment and being struck by lightning29 although
testimony did show that prior to being struck, the decedent had been
carrying a steel shovel. The court asserted that, had he been carrying
the shovel at the time he was struck by lightning, recovery would have
been allowed because the steel shovel would have increased the likeli-
hood of such injury, and hence, the requirement of a causal connec-
tion would have been met.30 In that case recovery was defeated by
the lack of evidence to show whether the decedent was actually carry-
ing the steel shovel at the time he was struck.
The value and importance of expert testimony in cases of this type
was discussed by the court in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Lara-
way,31 where recovery was allowed in a case for the employee being
struck by lightning because he was sweaty and carrying a broom with
steel bristles. This was said to increase the hazard of the employment
and expose the employee to dangers to which the general public was
not exposed. Although the case dealt specifically with claims for losses
due to the elements, it was an elaboration of the principle that there
should be some causal connection between the job and the injury set
forth in Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Weigandt3 2 some twelve years
before when the court was discussing compensability for accidental in-
juries generally.
Another area of claims resulting from the elements is that of claims
which arise from slips and falls due to ice and snow. The same rule
that applies to hazards common to the general public with regards to
other injuries caused by the elements is applied to these cases in Walborn
v. General Fireproofing Co.3 3 In that case the plaintiff sustained a
fractured pelvis when he slipped and fell on the ice and snow that had
fallen the previous night in the company parking lot. The claim was
disallowed when the court held that the hazard of ice and snow in the
parking lot was no different than that which was experienced by the
general public throughout the rest of the city on that particular morn-
ing. It would be expected that the hazards from ice and snow would
not be compensable, generally, for the very reason cited above, however,
the courts have allowed recovery from the state insurance fund under
certain conditions which differ somewhat from the "increased hazards"
and "causal connection" requirements found in the cases of storms and
lightning. It has been held that injuries resulting from falls on ice and
snow on sidewalks leading to and from the place of employment are
29 Industrial Comm. v. Carden, supra n. la.
80 Ibid.
31 Supra n. 2.
32 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
33 Supra n. 17.
May, 1970
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compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law if these side-
walks provide the sole means of ingress and egress, or where such way
is maintained by the employer.8 4 Recovery may also be obtained when
defects in such routes to and from the site of the employment are ob-
scured by a natural accumulation of snow, 35 or even where a force of
nature, in the form of slush, makes a natural hazard in the sidewalk
more active, especially where use of the particular sidewalk was re-
quired to travel to and from the situs of the employment.3 6
To this point this discussion has focused on injuries which are
traumatic in origin. Another way in which nature works a hardship on
the employee is by causing pathological conditions as a result of ex-
treme heat or excessive cold. In claims arising from illnesses or pathol-
ogies caused by temperature variations, it is found that the same gen-
eral rules apply and that heat or cold acting alone on the worker will
not support recovery. There must be an increased hazard to the em-
ployee or a causal connection between the forces of nature and the par-
ticular employment to permit recovery for the injured worker from the
state insurance fund.
In cases where excessive heat is the causative factor in producing
the resultant pathology, or death, many terms are utilized by the courts,
but the nature of these conditions may be categorized as either heat
stroke or as heat exhaustion.
When the resulting disorder is heat stroke, there has been a failure
of the heat elimination system of the body created by a breakdown of
the sweating mechanism. The pathological picture shows primary dam-
age to the central nervous system, with edema, and in severe cases, de-
struction of nerve cells of the cerebral cortex as a result of increased
body temperature to a level above 105 degrees. All untreated cases are
fatal, and even if proper treatment is instituted, but is not soon enough,
severe brain damage will result.37
In contrast to this, heat exhaustion is a nonfatal disturbance of
physiological function where vasomotor control and cardiac output are
not adequate to keep up with increased skin circulation. With fainting
being the predominant symptom, 38 the chief concern to the workmen's
compensation field would be for the claims arising out of injuries sus-
tained by striking something when the worker falls. There may be, how-
ever, cardiac and vascular diseases that may manifest themselves, as a
result of heat exhaustion.3 9
34 Stevens v. Industrial Comm., 145 Ohio St. 198, 61 N.E. 2d 198 (1946).
85 Barrett Div. v. Owens, supra n. 17.
86 Brennan v. Keller, supra n. 17.
37 Cecil & Loeb, Textbook of Medicine, 477, 10th Ed. (1959).
88 Id. at 476.
89 Ibid.
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In Johnson v. Industrial Commission of Ohio4° the court denied a
claim for the death of the plaintiff's husband from the effects of sun-
stroke. There the court held that his duties as a canvassing salesman
subjected him to no greater hazard than that to which the general pub-
lic had been exposed, basing its decision on the principle that had been
announced in the Slanina case.
40a
The opposite result was reached in the case of Kemna v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio,4 1 where the decedent, serving as a night watch-
man, was required to cover, in a period of one hour, a distance of close
to two miles, through ten buildings, up and down twenty-four flights of
stairs and check in at twenty-six clock stations, with the temperature
four or five degrees over the official temperature registered in the city,
which had been above 100 degrees for a period of four or five days. The
court found for the plaintiff, holding that the death of the decedent re-
sulted from the extreme state of the elements working in combination
with the hazards of the employment to satisfy the requirements of
causal connection between the elements and industry.
The principles of increased hazard and causal connection were also
applied in a case where the employee collapsed and subsequently died
after loading 100 pound sacks of cement onto a truck in temperatures
that reached 104 degrees. The court, in finding for the plaintiff, based
its decision on the opinion that the general public was not subjected to
such strenuous work in the midst of such excessive heat. It was not
the heat itself, nor was it the strenuous work alone that caused the death
of the decedent, but it was the combination of the elements and the em-
ployment which constituted a situation to which the public was not ex-
posed.42
Even though cases of heat stroke involve a disease process or physio-
logical dysfunction within the body, the cases now under consideration,
to be compensable, must be classified as accidental injuries. To be
compensable as diseases they would have to be specifically named in the
statutes as occupational diseases. The conclusion of accidental injury has
been reached by the courts by finding some unusual happening that will
take the case out of the category of the normal day-to-day hazards of the
business. One such example was found in the case of Ford Motor Co.
v. Hunter.43 There the claimant suffered heat exhaustion when the
breakdown of an automatic air pressure regulator made it necessary
for the employee to stand over an air compressor and operate the regu-
lator manually and, thereby, be subjected to temperature levels in ex-
40 Johnson v. Industrial Comm., supra n. la.
40a Supra n. 25.
41 12 Ohio Ops. 144 (1938).
42 Cavanaugh v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 18.
43 Supra n. 18.
May, 1970
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cess of 120 degrees. The question of compensability rests on the determi-
nation of physical harm or damage to the body based on more than
mere suspicion of connection between the forces of nature and the
hazard of the job.44
Contrary to Johnson v. Industrial Commission of Ohio45 is the case
of Rettig v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" where an employee suffered
sunstroke. There the employee, a maintenance man, was wheeling gravel
down a path between a cement walk and a low building, with another
building at the end of the path. At the time the man was stricken the
temperature was 108 degrees. Evidence was introduced to show that
the location of the buildings and the path cut off circulation in the area
as well as raising the temperature of the area by as much as fifteen
degrees above the already extreme heat. In its decision the court noted:
Most of the cases where recovery is permitted upon the theory of
accidental injury and sunstroke are grounded upon the proposition
that factors growing out of the employment other than the normal
forces of nature contributed materially to the injury of which com-
plaint was made.47
The compensability of losses caused by extreme heat has not been
restricted to extreme conditions of natural heat. In Malone v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio,4s the decedent was required to carry ladles of
molten lead to casting moulds and was thereby subjected to artificial
heat of about 113 degrees. Recovery was granted from the state in-
surance fund on the basis that an unforeseen, unexpected and unusual
event had accomplished the intentional actions of the workman to pro-
duce the injury. Therefore, the employee was subjected to a greater
hazard than was the general public and his injury was considered to be
accidental in character and result.
Exposure to extreme heat is only half of the problem that results
from the variations of temperature in Ohio. Another group of claims
arises as a result of workers being exposed to the cold and freezing of
the winter season.
The first problem encountered is that of frostbite. It can be de-
scribed as a freezing of the tissues with mechanical disruption of the
cellular structure from exposure to cold air, usually at a temperature
level below thirty degrees. If the condition is detected early, conserva-
tive treatment should be sufficient. However, if frostbite is deep, sepsis
and gangrene may necessitate amputation of the affected part.4 9
44 Ibid.
45 Supra n. la.
46 9 Ohio Ops. 422 (1937).
47 Id. at 424.
48 Supra n. 18.
49 Cecil & Loeb, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 1340.
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When surgical intervention was required on a worker who had con-
tracted frostbite of the right foot because his duties of cleaning out a
ditch required him to keep his right foot immersed in freezing water,
the Court of Appeals found that his injury and loss was compensable.50
In reaching their decision the court held that if there was a causal
relation between the injury and some unusual, unforeseen and unex-
pected occurrence that takes place while the workman is acting in the
course of his employment, it is compensable. The fact that the workman
had to stand with his right foot in freezing water was held to be a
hazard that was not commonly experienced by the other persons of the
community. Therefore, the increased hazard of his employment com-
bined with the forces of nature to produce his injury.
In the case of Kaiser v. Industrial Commission of Ohio5l the claim-
ant experienced freezing of his feet while working as an attendant at a
gasoline station. The injury occurred in December of 1929 and Kaiser
received compensation from the state insurance fund in 1931 for the
freezing of the right foot. However, disability was not noticed in the
left foot until sometime in 1936. The claim was disallowed because
the two year statute of limitations had elapsed. However, the court
stated the principle that accidental injuries from freezing were com-
pensable, when the exposure to cold weather placed the employee in
a position of greater risk than that to which the other members of the
community were exposed.
The exposure of an employee to the elements has been shown to be
compensable when a causal connection between the elements and the
job is found to have produced an accidental injury. This was carried
one step further in Moskell v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.52 There
compensation was allowed an employee who had become permanently
disabled because working in cold water deep enough to run into his
boots had aggravated a pre-existing arthritic and cardiac condition.
Up to this point it has been shown that weather conditions may be
classified as a contributing cause of "accidental injuries" under the
Workmen's Compensation definition. To categorize their effects as "oc-
cupational diseases," would not provide compensation because these
effects are not specifically enumerated in Section 4123.68 of the Ohio
Revised Code.5 3 When considering the occupational disease claims, the
procedure is at its conclusion once the Industrial Commission has labeled
something an occupational disease, for there is no right to appeal to the
50 Jones v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 2.
51 Supra n. 19.
52 Supra n. 19.
53 Industrial Comm. v. Middleton, 126 Ohio St. 212 (1933); Industrial Comm. v.
Franken, 126 Ohio St. 176 (1933).
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Court of Common Pleas of classifications of occupational diseases under
the Workmen's Compensation Law.54
This has a direct bearing on the subject at hand, for in the case of
Johnson v. Industrial Commission of Ohio55 the decedent contracted
pneumonia as a result of having to unload railroad cars on a cold and
rainy day when the wind was blowing and the temperature was near
freezing. In ruling on this appeal the court said:
a workman's weakened resistance to infection from pneumonia,
even though it may represent a derangement of his bodily functions
cannot be considered an injury within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Act.56
In arriving at that decision the court has classified pneumonia as a non-
compensable occupational disease, and the claimant is also barred from
the right to make further appeal to the courts.
Therefore, not only must the elements act in combination with the
employment to produce the loss, but also the loss must be such that it
will be classified as an "accidental injury" within the meaning of the
definition set forth by the statutes under the Workmen's Compensation
Laws.
Conclusion
It has been shown that simply because the forces of nature or an act
of God have played a part in causing an injury to a workman in the
course of his employment, he is not precluded from recovering compen-
sation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is
found that if the elements or an act of God are the sole causative factors
of the injury, then no remedy is available for the employee from the
state insurance fund. However, if the nature of the employment sub-
jects the employee to increased hazard from the elements or if there is
a causal connection between the forces of nature and the employment,
the combination of which produces the resulting injury, then the loss is
compensable.
It was mentioned earlier that a fine line seems to be drawn between
what claims are and are not allowable in a given situation. The line be-
comes almost impossible to discern when different forces of nature are
involved.
In the first instance it was shown that when two men were en-
gaged in the duties of their employment and were killed by lightning, the
fact that one man was carrying a steel-bristled broom made his death
a job related accident. Since the other man was not carrying a metal
implement at that moment, his claim was disallowed. When a man
54 Szekeley v. Young, 174 Ohio St. 213, 188 N.E. 2d 424 (1963).
55 Supra n. 20.
5o Id. at 309.
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sustains an injury from a tornado because his job requires him to be
out making deliveries regardless of the weather conditions, he is denied
recovery because he is subjected to no greater hazard than the public at
large. Another man's death, however, was considered to be job-related
because he was inside a company warehouse when the tornado leveled
the building in which he had sought refuge. The line is very fine indeed
between a warehouse and a delivery vehicle.
Upon consideration of claims of unlike causative factors, the differ-
entiation becomes even less clear. A canvassing salesman whose duties
demand he be out in the heat is said to have suffered no job related
loss when he suffers sunstroke because all the population is subjected
to the same heat. A gas station attendant who must be out in the cold
to sell gasoline has, however, suffered a compensable loss when he
contracts frostbite. However, it must be remembered that if the same
gas station attendant had contracted pneumonia from the exposure to
the cold instead of frostbite, he would have been considered to have
gotten an occupational disease that is not compensable because it was
not enumerated by the statute.
In the application of the established precedent to cases involving
the forces of nature, or acts of God, to a loss that could readily be com-
pared to an already established and decided situation the results would
be fairly predictable. However, each case presents a new and different
set of facts and circumstances, and many cases do not readily lend
themselves to being fitted into an already established mold.
Medical research is investigating the possibility that excessive ex-
posure to the sun may be a causative factor in the production of cancer
of the skin. If this is found to be true, it would be questionable whether
or not a lifeguard, or other worker whose duties required prolonged
exposure to the sun, would be compensated if he were to develop skin
cancer, or even if secondary infection from a severe sunburn was ex-
perienced. The result is unpredictability in attempting to decide whether
such a loss would be considered to have been an accidental injury oc-
curring in the course of, and arising out of the employment, or an occupa-
tional disease not specifically enumerated by the statute, or merely
another hazard common to the general public.
Another unanswered problem would arise in the case of a man
who worked around a building in the winter time and suddenly re-
ceives severe injuries when snow and ice slides down, or breaks loose
from the roof and comes crashing down upon him. Would the courts
grant him recovery for his injuries as they have done in certain in-
stances of slips and falls on company sidewalks that are covered with
snow, or would they assert that the likelihood of any member of the
community receiving the same injury be just as great, thus denying him
recovery from the state insurance fund?
May, 1970
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ACTS OF GOD AND WORKMEN'S COMP.
It is, therefore, submitted that steps should be taken to establish a
doctrine of positional risk57 for claims resulting from the forces of
nature and acts of God. The courts would then have a consistent basis
for the determination of compensability in these cases; they would not
have to search for some increased hazard or causal connection to grant
recovery. For compensability, it would be determined whether or not
the requirements of a man's employment caused him to be subjected
to forces of nature to which he would have been likely to have sub-
jected himself if he were not required to do so by his employment.
Under such a doctrine, determination of whether or not benefits
would be conferred for losses would be based on what the "reasonable
man" would be most likely to do under the circumstances.
The principles of compensability set forth by this method would give
a more consistent approach in deciding whether benefits would be paid
from the state insurance fund. The test would be whether the "reason-
able man" would be likely to expose himself to the specific peril that
the forces of nature create at that particular time and place.
This test could be applied equally well to any of the forces of nature
that have been discussed here and a more predictable and consistent
result could be obtained.
For example, where compensation was denied a man who fell vic-
tim to sunstroke because his duties required him to be out making sales
calls all day, the question should not be whether he was subjected to a
greater hazard than was the general public, but whether, because of
his job requirements, he was forced to be subjected to the sun and heat
of the day to a greater degree than he, or the general public, would
likely have subjected themselves voluntarily.
It would also seem unlikely that a reasonable man would volun-
tarily subject himself to a whole day of being outside on a cold, windy
and rainy day and run the risk of contracting pneumonia. Yet, under
the present Workmen's Compensation Law, if his job forces him to be
exposed to such weather conditions it is merely said that he has acquired
a non-compensable occupational disease and no recovery is available to
him, or his family, in case of his death.
It is equally unlikely that a reasonable man would not seek shelter
from an impending tornado or electrical storm. However, when the
duties of his employment demand that he continues to work in the
elements, recovery is decided by the unworkable principles of "increased
hazard" and "causal connection."
Here in the State of Ohio the man whose work carries him out-of-
doors may be subjected to almost any of the forces of nature, varying from
57 See United Service Insurance v. Donaldson, 254 Ala. 204, 48 So. 2d 3 (1950) and
Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922).
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extreme heat to excessive cold, as well as the devastating force of a tor-
nado or the electrical potential of lightning. The man who suffers physical
loss because his job places him in a position of jeopardy from the ele-
ments should not be forced to suffer the added financial burden that the
fine line of the law might now create in deciding who is to collect bene-
fits from the state insurance fund.
Rather than continue with the present inconsistencies relative to
claims arising from injuries sustained at the hands of the elements, the
clearer and more consistent method of determining compensability is ap-
plication of positional risk as a basis for liability.
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